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1 Introduction
1.1 A Starting Point
Since the work of Horn (1972) and Gazdar (1979), conversational implica-
tures triggered by scalar expressions are generally regarded as fairly well
understood, at least at a descriptive level (see e.g. the textbooks by Levin-
son (1983:132–36) and Gamut (1991:204–209)). The class of phenomena this
optimism is based on are exempliﬁed in (1) and (2). For these cases, it’s
generally agreed that the second sentence is an implicature of the ﬁrst.
(1) Kai had peas or broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have peas and broccoli last night.
(2) Kai had some of the peas last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
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1Gazdar (1979:57–61) proposes a precise mechanism for the computation of
such scalar implicatures (similar descriptions have been given by Horn 1989:214,
Atlas and Levinson 1981:33, Levinson 2000:76). It relies on the notion of a
quantitative scale that Horn (1972) introduced. Gazdar’s mechanism applies
only to sentences φ where an expression from a quantitative scale α appears
not in the scope of any logical operator. To such a sentence it assigns the
set of expressions of the form K¬ψ,w h e r eψ is derived from φ by replacing
o n eo c c u r r e n c eo fα, that’s not in the scope of any logical operator, with α
and there’s a scale Q on which α is the word following α. K here is the
epistemic certainty operator of Hintikka (1962), so the implicatures of φ can
each be paraphrased as Certainly not ψ where ψ is related to φ by a certain
replacement operation.1
Consider the examples in (1) and (2) for an illustration. The quantitative
scales required in the account of (1) and (2) are  or, and  and  some, all .
In each of the examples (1) and (2), there’s only one possible replacement to
consider, so there’s also only one implicature in each example. The implica-
ture assigned to (1) is then K¬Kai had peas and broccoli last night, and the
one assigned to (2) is K¬Kai had all of the peas last night. Since, at least
roughly, anything that’s certain is assertable and vice versa, the implicatures
predicted by Gazdar’s mechanism for (1) and (2) correspond to the indicated
intuitions.
1.2 Limitations of Gazdar’s Mechanism
Gazdar’s procedure is very limited since it only applies to cases that unlike
(1) and (2) contain scalar terms in the scope of a logical operator. This would
seem to predict that scalar terms in the scope of a logical operator never lead
to any implicatures. As other people have noticed this before, this prediction
is incorrect.2
1Gazdar (1979) distinguishes in his terminology between the potential implicatures of a
sentence and its actual implicatures. The results of his mechanism are actual implicatures
of a particular sentence only if they’re not cancelled by one of Gazdar’s implicature can-
cellation conventions. My use of terminology in the text therefore is sloppy, but I believe
suﬃciently clear for my purposes.
2In particular, Hirschberg (1985:72–74) suggests that Gazdar actually could do with a
much more lenient restriction. Namely, she proposes that only scalar terms in the scope
of negation are excluded from Gazdar’s mechanism. However, as will become clear from
the following discussion and is shown in footnote 4, Hirschberg’s suggestion has a number
of problems.
2While the class of problems associated with negation is often discussed,
the more serious problems actually arise in examples without negation and
downward entailing operators. In particular, there is a problem extending
Gazdar’s procedure to cases with disjunction and another operator in its
scope. This problem in its full generality was brought to my attention by
Gennaro Chierchia and Bernhard Schwarz.3 Consider example (3), which
looks like an innocent combination of (1) and (2).
(3) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night.
As we’ll see, (3) is actually a serious challenge for the theory of implicatures.
Consider ﬁrst what Gazdar predicts: Since Gazdar’s mechanism can only
apply to occurrences of scalar terms not in the scope of any other logical
operator, it only applies to “or” in (3). The occurrence of “some” in (3) is
in the scope of “or” and therefore not in the domain of Gazdar’s mechanism.
Therefore, only one implicature is predicted for (3), namely the one given in
(4).4
(4) (3)  Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
While this implicature is intuitively correct, both (3) and (4) would be log-
ically true in a situation where Kai ate all of the peas and no broccoli last
night, and therefore should a felicitous utterance in such a situation. But,
this doesn’t seem to be right. If you were to utter (3), while I knew for a fact
that Kai had all the peas last night, I would think you’re wrong. Hence, in
such a scenario, I would use (5a) in my reply to you, rather than (5b).
(5) a. No, he had all of the peas last night.
b.#Yes, he had all of the peas last night.
So, there seems to be at least one other implicature that’s drawn from (3).
For example, if (6) could be drawn as an implicature from (3) this would
3A special case of this puzzle, namely the case of disjunction below another disjunction,
seems to be aimed at by McCawley (1993:324) in an exercise and is discussed by Simons
(1998:88–96) (The ﬁrst edition of McCawley’s book (from 1981) might state the problem
more directly, but I have not been able to access this reference.)
4Hirschberg’s (1985) suggestion (see footnote 2) predicts (i) to be an implicature of (3)
(her example (75c) on page 73 is analogous).
(i)  It’s not the case that Kai had all of the peas or the broccoli last night.
But, (i) is too strong since it entails that Kai didn’t have the broccoli.
3capture the intuition just observed.
(6) (3)  Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
But, how to arrive at something like (6)?
1.3 Contributions of this Paper
As Chierchia (2001) argues, it isn’t obvious how to extend something like
Gazdar’s procedure to cases where a scalar term appears in the scope of
another logical operator. Therefore, Chierchia dismisses the entire picture of
Grice (1978) and develops one of his own.
My goal is to show that such a radical break is unwarranted. I show that
the disjunction problem can be solved within Grice’s framework.
This paper makes two contributions that are of a more technical nature.
On the one hand, I show that in general the implicatures of sentences con-
taining more than one scalar expression are computed by forming something
akin to the crossproduct of the two scales. On the other hand, I’ll argue that
the scale of disjunction is not just  or, and , but rather is a set that is only
partially ordered by entailment and contains the items “A or B”, “A”, “B”,
and “A and B”. Furthermore, I provide some fairly direct empirical evidence
for the claim of e.g. Soames (1982) and Horn (1989) that implicatures are
epistemically modalized.
I should mention that there’s one important question that I have nothing
to say about here: Namely, the question where quantitative scales come from.
I’ll here simple take quantitative scales for granted and use them to account
for the implicatures of sentences. See Hirschberg (1985), Matsumoto (1995),
and von Fintel and Heim (2000) for some interesting suggestions relating to
this question.
2 Crossing Scales
2.1 A Small Improvement
What implicatures are drawn from examples with a scalar term in the scope
of a logical operator? One initial problem to overcome is to deal with scalar
4terms in the scope of negation. Consider example (7) from Gazdar (1979).5
Here, the simple-minded application of Gazdar’s procedure would, by replac-
ing some with all and negating the result (where then the double negations
cancel each other out), arrive at the result in the second line of (7).
(7) It is not the case that Paul ate some of the eggs.
  Paul ate all the eggs. (Gazdar 1979:56)
But clearly, this result is incorrect for (7)—the putative implicature contra-
dicts the assertion. The root of the problem is that negation reverses scales
(Horn 1972:33, Atlas and Levinson 1981:33). Replacing some with all, when
it’s not in the scope of negation, often yields a stronger proposition, and if
that’s the case Gazdar’s procedure yields the right result. But when some
occurs in the scope of negation as in (7), replacing it with all yields a weaker
claim. That’s why Gazdar had to block his procedure from applying in this
case.
Gazdar’s solution to the negation problem—blocking implicature compu-
tation from applying to any scalar term in the scope of a logical operator
is stipulative, and doesn’t predict the implicature reversal actually observed
(Atlas and Levinson 1981:33 and others). A variant of Gazdar’s mechanism
that avoids the problem with negation in a better way is based on the idea to
divorce the replacement of a scalar term by an alternative from the computa-
tion of whether the result of the replacement lead to a stronger claim. While
this intuition seems to have been around since Horn (1972), I’m not aware of
technical implementation of this idea. I propose the following terminology to
capture the sentences derivable by replacements of scalar terms with terms
from the same scale:6
(8) A sentence ψ is one-step scalar alternative of φ if the following two
conditions hold:
a. φ  = ψ
b. there are scalar expressions α and α which both occur on the same
scale C such that ψ is the result of replacing one occurrence of α
5To my knowledge examples like (7) are the only reason Gazdar restricts his mechanism
to occurrences of scalar terms occurring in the scope of no other logical operator.
6Note that from this point on quantitative scales themselves don’t need to be repre-
sented as ordered lists anymore. It would be suﬃcient to represent them as plain sets. I’ll
stick to the tradition though.
5in φ with α.
(9) A sentence ψ is a scalar alternative of φ if there is a sequence (φ0,...,φ n)
with n ≥ 0a n dφ0 = φ and φn = ψ such that for all i with i ≥ 1a n d
i ≤ nφ i is a one-step scalar alternative of φi-1.
The proposal is then that a scalar alternative of an asserted sentence leads
to an implicature only if the scalar alternative is stronger than the assertion.
This is given in (10).
(10) ¬α is an implicature of α if the following three hold:
a. α is a scalar alternative of α
b. α entails α
c. α doesn’t entail α
Proposal (10) solves the negation problem: While an implicature is blocked
in Gazdar’s example (7), there’s an implicature in the reverse direction in
(11).
(11) It’s not the case that Paul ate all of the eggs.
 Paul ate some of the eggs.
2.2 Crossing Scales
The proposal just developed makes a prediction for the implicatures of sen-
tences that contain more than one scalar term. Abstractly, we can view a
sentence with two occurrences of a scalar term as φ(X,Y), where X is an
element of the quantitative scale QX and Y an element of the scale QY.T h e
set of scalar alternatives of φ(X,Y) is then isomorphic to the cross product
of the two scales Q and Q. This is apparent from the fact that (12) holds:
(12) ScalAlt(φ(X,Y)) = {φ(X,Y) | X an element of QX, Y  an element
of QY}
The predicted implicatures are then all those sentences φ(X,Y)t h a te n t a i l
φ(X,Y). To a large extent this prediction is borne out, but as we’ll see there
are a few remaining problems (including the recalcitrant (3) from above).
Consider ﬁrst examples where neither of the two scalar expressions is in
the scope of each other, nor in the the scope of any other logical operator.
For such cases, Gazdar’s procedure actually makes the same prediction as the
6system developed above. It’s not easy to come up with examples that satisfy
this restriction, but (13) and (14) can I think be argued to do so. For (14),
though, this is only the case for the cumulative reading, which is indicated by
the **-operator (Beck and Sauerland 2001 and references therein) and even
that might be questionable. The predicted implicatures are shown below
these two examples.
( 1 3 ) T h ef a t h e ro fs o m eo ft h eb o y sk n e ws o m eo ft h ea n s w e r s .
 ¬( t h ef a t h e ro fe v e r yb o yk n e ws o m eo ft h ea n s w e r s )
 ¬( t h ef a t h e ro fs o m eo ft h eb o y sk n e wa l lo ft h ea n s w e r s )
 ¬( t h ef a t h e ro fa l lo ft h eb o y sk n e wa l lo ft h ea n s w e r s )
(14) 600 Dutch ﬁrms **have 5000 American computers. (Scha 1984:146)
 ¬(601 Dutch ﬁrms **have 5000 computers)
 ¬(600 Dutch ﬁrms **have 5001 computers)
 ...(allotherimplicatures are entailed by the previous two)
Are these implicatures actually correct? While my intuition looking at this
examples is a little unclear, if I consider them as answers to a relevant ques-
tion, I think they are in accord with the prediction.7 For (13) such a
context would be provided by the question Who knew how many of the an-
swers?, and for (14) by How many ﬁrms have how many computers?. It helps
with the judgement on (14) to slightly change the numbers in the example;
for instance, to 599 and 4999.
A further argument that (13) has indeed the predicted implicatures is
provided by the data in (15).
(15) a. The fathers of some of the boys knew some of the answers, and
possibly even the father of all of the boys knew some of the an-
swers.
b . T h ef a t h e r so fs o m eo ft h eb o y sk n e ws o m eo ft h ea n s w e r s ,a n d
possibly the father of some of the children knew even all of the
answers.
7Speciﬁcally, my intuition is that the ﬁrst two implicatures in both examples could be
false, but only if there’s a falsifying instance for the indeﬁnite that doesn’t overlap with the
verifying instance for the corresponding indeﬁnite in the asserted sentence. For example,
(13) would be acceptable in a scenario where also the father of some other boys knew all
of the answers. At present, I have no account of this intuition, but I would like to come
back to this issue in some future research.
7Horn (1972:30) argues that suspender clauses (i.e. clauses that cancel an
implicature) like those initiated by and possibly even are only acceptable, if
they express an actual implicature. Therefore, the acceptability of the data
in (16) argues that (14) indeed has the two ﬁrst implicatures given in (14).
Now consider sentences where there’s a scopal relation. Speciﬁcally con-
sider (16) and (17), which fall outside of the scope of Gazdar’s mechanism,
since here both occurrences of scalar terms other than and are in the scope of
and in both examples. The implicatures predicted by the proposal currently
under investigation are shown below the assertion in (16) and (17).
(16) John read A or B and watched C or D.
 ¬ ( J o h nr e a dAa n dBa n dw a t c h e dCo rD )
 ¬ ( J o h nr e a dAo rBa n dw a t c h e dCa n dD )
 ¬ (John didn’t read A and B and watched C and D)
(17) Kai ate some of the strawberries and Hannes ate some of the carrots.
 ¬(Kai ate all of the strawberries and Hannes ate some of the car-
rots)
 ¬(Kai ate some of the strawberries and Hannes ate all of the car-
rots)
 ¬(Kai ate all of the strawberries and Hannes ate all of the carrots)
For both (16) and (17), the predicted implicatures shown seem to be correct.
To make the judgement easier, consider that the conjunction of the assertion
and the implicatures of (17) entail the two statements in (18).8
(18) a. Kai didn’t eat all of the strawberries.
b. Hannes didn’t eat all of the carrots.
Examples (16) and (17) illustrate scalar expressions in the scope of nega-
tion. I don’t have examples with two scalar expressions in the scope of
negation, but not in the scope of each other, since I found these too diﬃ-
cult to form a judgment on. But, consider (19), which seems to behave as
predicted.
(19) It’s not the case that every child knows every parent.
 Some child knows every parent.
8These two entailments are exactly the implicatures that the ﬁrst and the second con-
junct of (17) have, when they occur as single sentences.
8 Every child knows some parent.
 Some child knows some parent.
Finally consider examples where one scalar expression occurs in the scope
of another. This class of examples will be most relevant for the remainder
of this paper. Consider ﬁrst the examples (20) and (21). Again I show the
predicted implicatures below each of the examples.
(20) Winnie is allowed to smoke three cigarettes today.
 Winnie isn’t required to smoke three cigarettes today.
 Winnie isn’t allowed to smoke four cigarettes today.
 ...(allotherimplicatures are entailed by the previous two)
(21) Some of the children found some of their presents.
 Not all of the children found some of their presents.
 Some of the children didn’t ﬁnd all of their presents.
 ¬(All of the children found all of their presents)
Again, the predicted implicatures are intuitively correct in both of (20) and
(21). As the following section shows, though, there are certain systematic
exceptions to the prediction made amongst examples with a scalar expression
below another.
2.3 Remaining Problems
At present, I’m aware of two cases where the account developed in 2.1 makes
empirically wrong predictions. These are, on the one hand, examples where a
scalar term occurs in the scope of disjunction, which were already mentioned
in (3) above. On the other hand, cases where a scalar term occurs in the
scope of an epistemic modal turn out to be problematic.
Consider now the ﬁrst class of empirical problems: Scalar expressions
in the scope of disjunction. In (22), example (3) is repeated with the two
implicatures that were observed above.
(22) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
To see what the proposal under discussion predicts, observe the set of scalar
alternatives of (22) in (23).
9(23) ScalAlt((22)) = {a, b, c}
a. Kai had all of the peas or the broccoli last night.
b. Kai had some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
c. Kai had all of the peas and the broccoli last night.
Scalar implicatures arise from those scalar alternatives that entail (22). Since
all three of (23a), (23b) and (23c) entail (22), three implicatures are pre-
dicted. While (23b) and (23c) don’t cause any problems, (23a) predicts that
(24) should be an implicature of (23).
(24)   ¬(Kai had all of the peas or the broccoli last night.)
This result, however, is wrong (Chierchia 2001:6). (24) entails that Kai
didn’t have the broccoli last night. But, clearly (22) doesn’t implicate that
Kai didn’t have the broccoli last night.9
As I mentioned above the problem occurs more generally with scalar ex-
pressions in the scope of disjunction. Consider Simons’s (1998:94) discussion
of (25) (possibly the point goes back to McCawley (1993), see footnote 3).
(25) A or B or C
 not (A and B)
 not (A and C)
 not (B and C)
Simons observes that the implicatures shown in (25) are the ones the sentence
actually has. These are equivalent to the claim that only one out of A, B and
C is true. Compare this to the predictions of the current proposal shown in
(26).
(26) Predictions for (25)
a.  ¬ (A and (B or C))
b.   ¬ (A or (B and C))
Since (26b) entails ¬A, (26b) can’t be an implicature of (25), which would
be an acceptable assertion in case the speaker knew that A is false.
The other family of problems for the proposal in section 2.1 are scalar
terms under epistemic modals. The problem is illustrated by the minimal
9In footnote 4, I pointed out that Hirschberg’s (1985) proposal runs into exactly the
problem observed in the text here.
10pairs comparing epistemic might with a diﬀerent modal.10
(27) a. Winnie might smoke three cigarettes today.
b. Winnie is allowed to smoke three cigarettes today. (= (20))
(28) a. Kai possibly ate seven grapes.
b. Kai is capable of eating seven grapes.
The pairs in (27) and (28) diﬀer in whether an implicature based on the scalar
alternatives derivable by strengthening the scalar term under the modal is
observed. The felicity of the responses in (29) for (27) and in (30) for (28)
brings out the diﬀerence.
(29) a.#No, Winnie possibly smokes four cigarettes today.
b. No, Winnie is allowed to smoke four cigarettes today.
(30) a.#No, Kai possibly ate eight grapes.
b. No, Kai is capabale of to eating eight grapes.
With epistemic might, there’s no implicature of the form ¬might [a stronger
alternative of the scope of might]. And possibly behave analogous. However,
such an implicature is predicted for might in just the same way as observed
with other existential modals like allowed to in (20) and in (28b) above, and
in a similar fashion for possibly. This problem, I at present don’t have a
solution for.11
10For reasons I don’t fully understand disjunction behaves diﬀerently from cardinals in
the scope of an epistemic modal. Consider (i), which seems to me to have the implicature
that Kai never did both singing and dancing. This might argue that that the generalization
in the text is oversimplieﬁed:
(i) a. Kai might have (either) sung or danced today.
b. No, Kai might have sung and danced.
11Of course, it would be possible to stipulate some assumption that does nothing but
block implicatures from the scope of an epistemic modal; for example, one might assume
that any speaker, who asserts might φ implies thereby that, for all scalar alternatives ψ of
φ “might ψ and might not ψ”.
113 Disjunction and the Epistemic Step
3.1 The Scale of Disjunction
In this section, I consider the cases with disjunction that has a scalar term
in its scope. We saw above that the proposal developed in section 2.1 didn’t
predict the second implicature in example (31) (repeated from (3)).
(31) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
Which of the assumptions going into the proposal 2.1 could be changed to
predict this implicature. A straightforward way of adding the implicature
to the set of implicatures predicted by the proposal is to assume the more
elaborate scale for disjunction in (32).
(32) The Scale of Disjunction
A ∨ B




B




A
A ∧ B
The diamond shape expresses the opinion that, in contrast to other cases
of quantitative scales, the scale of disjunction is a set that is only partially
ordered by entailment.
If the scale of a disjunction is indeed the one shown in (32), the set of
scalar alternatives of (31) includes the sentence (33).
(33) Kai had all the peas last night.
From (33), it immediately follows that the second implicature in (31) is
predicted to be an implicature of (31).
However, the assumption that (32) is the scale of disjunction makes a
number of undesirable predictions. For one, it predicts that for any assertion
A the following should hold: for any proposition B, since A is on the scale
in (32), A ∧ B should be a scalar alternative of A. But, since A ∧ B entails
A, ¬(A ∧ B) should be an implicature of A for any B. From this implica-
ture and the assertion A, however, ¬B follows. This prediction is clearly
12undesired: Asserting “It rains” implicates neither “John sneezed” nor “John
didn’t sneeze”, though both of this implicatures are predicted at this point.
One way to rule out these particular prediction would be to say that, since,
assuming the truth of the assertion, they contradict each other, they cancel
each other out. However, clearly any cognitve mechanism actually comput-
ing implicatures must know in advance that these inﬁnitely many potential
implicatures don’t arise. Therefore, it might be preferable to block such im-
plicatures in a more direct manner. One option in this direction would be to
assume that the scale of disjunction actually consists only of binary propo-
sition operators, but that there are lexical entries for two such operators l
and r deﬁned as following.12
(34) for any two propositions A, B: A l B = A and A r B=B
Since now A is not actually an element of a scale, the problem noted above
doesn’t arise. Evidently though this solution is more of a technical trick,
than a real solution for the problem noted above. Nevertheless, I’ll assume
it for now.
A second problem has a more fruitful eﬀect, I believe. For a statement
of the form A ∨ B the scale in (32) predicts the implicatures ¬Aa n d¬B
since both A and B are scalar alternatives of A ∨ B. But, these two predicted
implicatures don’t actually seem to be observed. At least in example (35),
it’s odd to cancel one of these putative implicatures.
(35) #It’s raining or Kai is peeing a lot and possibly it’s even raining.
I believe that we nevertheless want to continue to assume something like
the scale in (32) for disjunction. The problem observed here can, as I’ll
show now, be related to an old, controversial issue in the computation of
implicatures—the epistemic status of the implicature.
3.2 The Epistemic Status of Implicatures
My starting point in this investigation has been the mechanism Gazdar (1979)
proposes to predict the implicatures of a sentence φ. Soames (1982:521) and
Horn (1989:543, n5), criticize one aspect of Gazdar’s mechanism: namely,
the epistemic commitment assigned to the implicatures by Gazdar’s proposal.
12It follows from the Gricean maxim of brevity that l and r can never be used in an
assertion.
13While both Soames and Horn agree that implicatures of φ arise from certain
stronger statements ψ, they argue that it only follows from Gricean maxims
of conversation that ψ is uncertain, rather than that ψ is certainly false as
Gazdar claims.13 Following Gazdar, I’ll employ the K-operator to express
epistemic certainty, and the P-operator for epistemic possibility (Hintikka
1962). Using this terminology, Soames and Horn’s claim is that implicatures
are initially ¬Kψ rather than K¬ψ. Furthermore Soames and Horn point
out that Gazdar’s K¬ψ follows from their initial implicature if it’s assumed
that e.g. Kψ∨K¬ψ holds, and that in fact we usually seem to make some
such additional assumption in conversation. This then explains the fact that
Gazdar’s proposal made the right empirical prediction in many cases.
The proposal in section 2.1 adopted the assumption from Gazdar that
the procedure directly arrives at a set of epistemically certain implicatures
of the form K¬ψ. Therefore, the criticism mentioned applies to this proposal
in the same way. In the analysis I develop for the disjunction problem in
the following, the point Soames and Horn raise is an important part of the
solution. I claim that the distinction between the “uncertain ψ” implicatures
that follow from Gricean maxim’s of conversation, and the “certain not ψ”
implicatures Gazdar predicts is important for the explanation of the impli-
catures of disjunction. Therefore, I introduce a terminological distinction
between these two types of implicatures: I’ll call the Soames/Horn type im-
plicatures primary implicatures, and the Gazdar type implicatures secondary
implicatures. An set of all implicatures predicted by this analysis is then the
unions set of the sets of primary or a secondary implicatures.
(36) If ψ ∈ ScalAlt(φ)a n dψ ⇒ φ and not φ ⇒ ψ, then ¬Kψ is a primary
implicature of φ.
(37) If ¬Kψ is a primary implicature of φ and K¬ψ is consistent with the
conjunction of φ and all primary implicatures of φ, then K¬ψ is a
secondary implicature of φ.
The condition in (37) rules out the case in which a secondary implicature
contradicts the conjunction of the primary implicatures and the assertion.
This assumption introduces a hierarchy amongst the implicatures, and one
13The following discussion is framed in terms of impersonal certainty of a certain propo-
sition, rather than whether the speaker is certain or not of some proposition as assumed
e.g. by Gamut (1991). The diﬀerence, however, is only in the notation—I want to stick
with the impersonal epistemic K-operator that Gazdar (1979) uses.
14must ask why it’s not possible to cancel the primary implicature or the as-
sertion, rather than the secondary implicature if there is a conﬂict between
the two. However, this hierarchy follows if we consider the sets of assump-
tions that go into the reasoning that one of these is true. To reason that
the assertion is true, one only needs to appeal to the assumption that the
speaker making an assertion is obeying one of Grice’s maxims, namely “Tell
the truth”. To reason that the primary implicatures arise, one needs the
assumption that the speaker making an assertion is obeying all of Grice’s
maxims.14 Finally, to reason for a secondary implicature K¬ψ one has to
assume that the speaker obeys all the Gricean maxims to derive ¬Kψ and
furthermore that Kψ∨K¬ψ or some stronger assumption is justiﬁed.
The distinction between primary and secondary implicatures now leads
to a new prediction when combined with the scale for disjunction in (32).
Consider a abstract statement of the form A ∨ B. From the scalar alternatives
in (32), the primary implicatures in (38) follow straightforwardly.
(38) a. ¬K A
b. ¬K B
c. ¬K (A ∧ B)
The implicatures (38a) and (38b) are already observed by Gazdar (1979:50,(41)).
Therefore, the result that we predict these implicatures is empirically cor-
rect. Since, (38c) is entailed by (38a) or (38b) it’s also empirically conﬁrmed.
Gazdar accounts for the implicatures (38a) and (38b) as clausal quantity im-
plicatures (page 59). It does, however, seem desirable to eliminate this con-
cept which Gazdar only makes use of to account for two examples: (40) and
(41) on page 50. I believe this to be possible on the basis of the distinction
between primary and secondary implicatures developed here.15
Which of the primary implicatures in (38) gives rise to secondary implica-
tures? To answer this question, we need to decide which of the the potential
14I haven’t investigated how cases where a proper subset of all maxims gives rise to a
primary implicature are to be treated. Maybe this can force the cancellation of primary
implicatures that are drawn from all the maxims. Or, maybe the hearer makes really just
one assumption about the speaker. Namely, that he is cooperative, which is equivalent to
the conjunction of all of Grice’s maxims.
15Gazdar (1979:136) argues that if a clausal implicature conﬂicts with a scalar impli-
cature the latter is cancelled. This is reminiscent of the hierarchy between primary and
secondary implicatures I proposed. A diﬀerence might be, though, that the hierarchy
assumed here can be derived in the way shown above.
15secondary implicatures are consistent with the conjunction of all primary im-
plicatures and the assertion. Consider ﬁrst the secondary implicature arising
form (38a), namely K¬ A. This secondary implicature is blocked because
it follows from the assertion K(A ∨ B) and the primary implicature (38b),
that A must possibly be true. The secondary implicature K¬ B, which could
arise from (38b), is blocked in a similar way. Finally, consider the secondary
implicature K¬ (A ∧ B). This implicature is consistent with the assertion
and the primary implicatures, and therefore predicted to actually arise. This
prediction is actually borne out, since this implicature is in fact the exclu-
siveness implicature of disjunction illustrated by (1) at the beginning. This
result is summarized in (39):
(39) secondary implicatures of A ∨ B:
a.   K¬ A (blocked)
b.   K¬ B (blocked)
c.  K¬ (A ∧ B) (Exclusiveness)
3.3 Scalar Terms in the Scope of Disjunction
Now, we’re ready to address example (3) and the general class of problematic
examples it exhibits: examples with a scalar term in the scope of disjunction.
I repeat example (3) with its implicatures in (40).
(40) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
Consider ﬁrst the list of primary implicatures predicted by the approach of
the previous section.
(41) a. ¬K(Kai had some of the peas last night)
b. ¬K(Kai had the broccoli last night)
c. ¬K(Kai had some of the peas and the broccoli last night)
d. ¬K(Kai had all of the peas last night)
e. ¬K(Kai had all of the peas or the broccoli last night)
f. ¬K(Kai had all of the peas and the broccoli last night)
Again, all of these primary implicatures seem unproblematic.
16Consider now the secondary implicatures that potentially arise from (41).
As we’ve already seen by means of the abstract consideration of A ∨ Bi n
(38) above the secondary implicatures from (41a) and (41b) are blocked,
while (41c) gives rise to a secondary implicature.
Now consider K¬(Kai had all of the peas last night), which arise from
(41d). This is actually consistent with the the assertion shown in (40) and
all the primary implicatures shown in (41). This is demonstrated by the fact
that there are scenarios where the assertion, all primary implicatures, and
K¬(Kai had all of the peas last night) holds. Consider the following: I wasn’t
present for Kai’s dinner, but I conclude from circumstantial evidence that
he must’ve had peas or broccoli last night. Furthermore, I saw some peas
in the fridge, but I don’t remember whether there were more peas. So, I’m
sure that Kai didn’t eat all the peas, but I don’t know whether any of them
disappeared. I didn’t investigate whether there’s broccoli in our fridge. In
this scenario, I’m certain that Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli (the
assertion). I’m not certain that he had some of the peas ((41a)), or even all
of the peas ((41d)), or that he had the broccoli ((41b)). To verify the other
three primary implicatures, recall the following equivalences that generally
hold: ¬Kφ is equivalent to P¬φ, ¬ (A or B) is equivalent to ¬ Aa n d¬ B,
and P(A or B) is equivalent to PAo rPB. Hence, the truth of (41c) can be
seen by considering that it’s possible that Kai didn’t have some of the peas.
The equivalencies in (42) follow:
(42) (41c) ⇔ P¬(Kai had some of the peas last night)
or P¬(Kai had the broccoli last night)
(41e) ⇔ P(Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night
and didn’t have the broccoli last night)
(41f) ⇔ P¬(Kai had all of the peas last night)
or P¬(Kai had the broccoli last night)
Now, it’s easy to see that (41c) and (41f) are entailments of (41b). That (41e)
is true in the scenario given can be veriﬁed by considering that everything
said there is compatible with Kai having only eaten some of the peas and
nothing else. Finally, in the scenario it’s certain that Kai didn’t eat all the
peas, hence the putative secondary implicature is also fulﬁlled. Hence, this
secondary implicature is actually predicted.
Now consider the secondary implicature arising from (41e): K¬(Kai had
all of the peas or the broccoli last night). It follows from the assertion and
17the primary implicature (41a) that P(Kai had the broccoli last night) must
hold. Since this is inconsistent with the secondary implicature arising from
(41e), this secondary implicature must be blocked.
Finally, the secondary implicature from (41f)—K¬(Kai had all of the
peas and the broccoli last night)—is entailed by the secondary implicature
contributed by (41d). Hence, it isn’t blocked, but also doesn’t provide any
additional information. In sum, we have therefore shown that the two sec-
ondary implicatures in (42) are predicted by the approach developed in the
previous section.
(43)  K¬(Kai had some of the peas and the broccoli last night)
 K¬(Kai had all of the peas last night)
These are the two implicatures that the example (3) was argued to have. We
have now accounted for the example (3). I leave it up to the reader to verify
that the proposal extends to the other cases of scalar terms in the scope of
disjunction noted in section 2.3 above.
4 Conclusion
The mechanism for the generation of scalar implicatures discussed in this
paper has allowed us to predict the right implicatures for examples like (44)
(repeated from (3)). I argued that, in general, implicatures can arise from
scalar expressions embedded under logical operators, but that one must be
careful when considering examples like (44) where a scalar term occurs within
the scope of disjunction.
(44) Kai had some of the peas or the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have some of the peas and the broccoli last night.
 Kai didn’t have all of the peas last night.
I have shown that a simple picture of how scalar implicatures can be uni-
formly computed as the negation of all the logically strictly stronger scalar
alternatives according to the deﬁnitons in section 2.1.
I then showed one class of cases that still remained problematic; namely,
cases of a scalar term embedded under disjunction. I showed that an account
of such cases is possible based on two assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption is
that the scale of a disjunction A ∨ B isn’t simply A ∧ B, but also includes
18A and B. This scale is introduced in (32). The second assumption was the
adoption of a two step approach to implicatures as characterized by diﬀerent
epistemic quality. This result is presented in section 3.3.
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